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Applied Federation Technology: The Charging of Roaming
Students
Abstract
SAML federations provide students the possibility to use their home university's account even in case
they decide to study one or more semesters abroad. The visited university can rely on the identity
information transmitted via the federation's mechanisms. However, when services at the visited
university require payment, such as using a printer, the roaming student is nevertheless required to have
a local account, since the federation does not support payment. Therefore, the purpose of this research
paper is to provide information about changes and enhancements to the federation's architecture as well
as to the used protocol, i.e., SAML, to enable payment within SAML federations. Thus, the SAML
definitions have been taken as fundamentals for payment related enhancements. Furthermore, the
enhanced federation was validated and prototypically implemented to prove correctness and real-life
usage. This led to the result that it is feasible to provide payments within a SAML federation as long as
the modifications proposed within this paper are carried out.
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the federation’s mechanisms. However, when services at the visited university require payment, such as using a 
printer, the roaming student is nevertheless required to have a local account, since the federation does not 
support payment. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research paper is to provide information about changes and enhancements to the 
federation’s architecture as well as to the used protocol, i.e., SAML, to enable payment within SAML 
federations. Thus, the SAML definitions have been taken as fundamentals for payment related enhancements. 
Furthermore, the enhanced federation was validated and prototypically implemented to prove correctness and 
real-life usage. This led to the result that it is feasible to provide payments within a SAML federation as long as 
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Introduction 
Although not many, but some of those services offered by universities require payment, which typically 
addresses the group of students. These services could be, e.g., printer access, copy machines, university’s library, 
food and drink at the cafeteria. While it is usually the case that many of these services are free for scientific staff, 
students studying at the university may be required to pay for them. Until now, payment solutions for students 
have followed a simple approach: Each student enrolled at a university was assigned a single account, which 
could be initialized by a certain amount and filled-up at a later stage. This account was handled either 
electronically or with special cards, e.g., copy-cards. However, in the context of the Bologna plan for mobile 
students, such a static solution would not be applicable any more, since multiple accounts would be necessary 
resulting in a large overhead. 
 
Therefore, this paper provides a summary of current research on how federation technologies, based on the 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [1] and such as Shibboleth [2] or Liberty Alliance [3], can be 
used to provide a new payment solution for exactly those university services that require payment. Many 
universities already participate in national federations (e.g., [4] or [5]), and confederations such as eduGAIN [6] 
have been developed. As a basis for the payment approach, SAML has been selected, which is based on the fact 
that SAML determines an approach of an established federation technology and it will be easy to integrate 
payments into that technology. Therefore, this work here focuses on how a reliable payment solution can be 
designed, requiring only minor changes and enhancements to SAML. 
 
A simple scenario, in which SAML based payment may be required, could look as follows: A student studies at 
his/her Home University (HU) and decides to study one semester abroad at Foreign University (FU). Since HU 
and FU participate in the same academic federation, the student is not required to set up an account at FU. Thus, 
when he/she wants to print some papers there, he/she performs the authorization with the credentials from HU. 
The authentication is done at HU and information about the student’s attributes is transmitted to FU via the 
federation infrastructure. However, since payment is required for usage of the printer, federation based payment 
becomes evident. The student is informed that he/she has to pay 0.50 € for printing the pages. Thus, he/she 
contacts his/her Payment Provider, which issues, in turn, payment data to him/her. The student pays the printer 
with those data and, afterwards, FU can request reimbursement of the payment data at the student’s Payment 
Provider. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: After the introduction, a brief overview on the possible payment solutions for 
federations is given, followed by a section in which the SAML based payment solution is explained in detail, 
providing information how the federation’s architecture and its protocol have to be modified to support 
payments. Afterwards, a section mentions the security considerations that arise from the SAML payment 
approach. Possible attacks as well as their countermeasures are described. This is followed by a section that 
explains how the SAML payment approach has been validated and implemented. After a section that illustrates, 
how the payment approach works within the scenario presented in brief in the introduction, this paper finishes 
with conclusion, in which the results achieved in this paper are summarized. 
Payment Solutions 
To solve the question on how to collect payments for such charging requiring university-based services, three 
different solutions exist. As mentioned above, (a) locally administered student accounts can be utilized. The 
student credits the account with a small sum of money, which the university controls (a prepaid and local 
solution). However, applying this approach to a roaming student, studying at several universities across Europe, 
requires unacceptable efforts. Alternatively, (b) a global payment system can be applied, such as credit cards or 
PayPal [7]. Although this would offer the student an easy payment process, universities are now bound to 
complex installations and deployments, since, just to present a simple example, a common printer does not offer 
a direct credit card interface for deducting relevant costs. Finally, as developed in the following sections, (c) the 
integration of payments into federation technology determines a reasonable solution. Thus, universities applying 
federation technologies can still rely on a locally hosted solution without having problems with roaming 
students, since their payments are handled by their local so-called Payment Providers. 
Federation Based Payment 
Within this paper, the integration of payment issues into the federation’s architecture and its protocols is seen as 
a good way of establishing a payment solution for roaming students. But the current deployed federations do not 
offer payment approaches, thus, the federation must be enhanced. However, the focus during these modifications 
is on keeping changes within the federation as small as possible. The following subsections explain how (a) the 
federation infrastructure and (b) the SAML protocol used within the federation must be modified to provide a 
reliable federation based payment. 
Federation Architecture Modification 
Since most of the academic federations rely on SAML, we assume a common SAML federation as foundation 
for the required modifications to enable payments. A typical SAML federation consist of three kinds of 
participants: User, Identity Provider and Service Provider. 
• User / Consumer: The User (in the context of consuming charged services also called Consumer) is 
seen as being the person, who wishes to gain access to an online resource offered by a Service Provider. 
Usually, a web browser is used for accessing the service but, in some cases special applications are 
required. 
• Identity Provider: The Identity Provider controls the user’s account and hosts his/her data, such as the 
authentication data as well as the attributes. It is responsible for authenticating the user and for sending 
the user’s authentication and attribute data to the requesting Service Providers. 
• Service Provider: The Service Provider offers services to the federation participants. Whenever a 
participant requests access to a provided service, the Service Provider checks if the requestor is allowed 
to consume the service. Usually, this is done by an evaluation of the authentication data and the 
attributes of the participant. 
 
For payment support, this list of participants has to be enhanced with one new component: the Payment Provider.  
The Payment Provider is responsible for handling all payment related issues within the federation similarly to the 
tasks carried out by the Identity Provider with respect to identity information. In detail, the Payment Provider has 
to issue payment data when requested, it must validate payment data that have been used for payment and, 
finally, it has to reimburse payment data into real money. Those three tasks are described within the next 
paragraphs. An overview of the proposed structure of the Payment Provider and the tasks it has to carry out is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
The first task, the Payment Provider is in charge of, is the generation of payment data. Whenever a federation 
participant having an account at the Payment Provider requests payment data generation, the Payment Provider 
has to check whether the requestor has enough money at his/her account. If so, it generates the requested 
payment data, charges the requestor’s account, stores locally validity information about the generated data, such 
as artifact, assertion, lifetime and ID, and sends the generated payment data to the requestor.  
 
Since payment relies very much on security and validity, the Payment Provider has to validate the payment data 
if requested. Whenever it receives a request for validation, usually from the payee in a payment process, it 
checks its validity by examining whether the data’s ID is already marked as spent in the local storage. If not, the 
Payment Provider sends a positive validation answer to the requestor, but marks now the data as being spent, 
thus, the next request for validation will end in a negative answer. 
 
The third task, the Payment Provider has to handle, is the reimbursement of payment data into real money. The 
reimbursement is usually requested by the payee of a payment process and can be done either directly after the 
payment or at a later time. However, when the Payment Provider receives a request for reimbursement, it has to 
check the payment data’s validity. Thus, firstly the signature of the payment data is examined and, afterwards, 
the validity information are loaded from the local storage to verify, that the payment data was issued by this 
Payment Provider and it has not been reimbursed before. If all validity checks are passed successfully, the 
Payment Provider credits the requestor’s account with the amount of money conveyed within the payment data. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Structural Overview of the Payment Provider and its Tasks. 
Federation Protocol Modification 
Not only has the federation’s architecture to be enhanced, the used protocol, i.e. SAML, has to be modified, too. 
Those protocol changes must be done in such a way that the modified protocol is able to support the three 
payment related processes within the federation: payment data generation process, payment process and payment 
data reimbursement process. Therefore, the following paragraphs describe how SAML is used to fulfil the 
requirements given by those processes. 
 
When using SAML, the pieces of information are transmitted usually within request and response messages 
carrying assertions and statements as defined in [8]. Thus, the SAML elements have to be modified in such a 
way that the request for payment data as well as the response including the payment data is possible. To enhance 
the request message, a simple extension is defined that enables the request for payment data. For providing an 
adequate response message, a new type of assertion, the SAML Payment Assertion, containing a new type of 
statement, the SAML Payment Statement, has to be designed. This means that the definition of a SAML 
Assertion must be enhanced and a new statement has to be developed. The following paragraphs describe the 
changes required in detail and provide an overview on how these changes support the requirements of the 
payment related processes. 
 
There are several steps when payment data may be requested. Firstly, a consumer requests payment data at 
his/her PP, then, an SP could demand payment data from a consumer and, finally, a payment provider requests 
payment data from an SP during a reimbursement process. However, the abstract type SAML request [8] can be 
enhanced as follows to support the payment request: 
 
1 <element name="PaymentRequestExtension" type="samlp:Extension"> 
2 <complexType name="PaymentRequest"> 
3  <complexContent> 
4   <extension base="saml:RequestAbstractType"> 
5    <attribute name="Amount" type="string" use="required"/> 
6   <attribute name="Currency" type="string" use="required"/> 
7   <attribute name="statementExpiry" type="dateTime" use="required"/> 
8   </extension> 
9  </complexContent> 
10 </complexType> 
 
The response type, also defined in [8], does not have to be modified, since the new designed data is stated within 
a novel SAML statement. However, this means that not the response type, but the definition of the assertion 
taken from [8] has to be changed as follows: 
 
1 <element name="Assertion" type="saml:AssertionType"/> 
2 <complexType name="AssertionType"> 
3  <sequence> 
4   <element ref="saml:Issuer"/> 
5   <element ref="ds:Signature" minOccurs="0"/> 
6   <element ref="saml:Subject" minOccurs="0"/> 
7   <element ref="saml:Conditions" minOccurs="0" 
8   <element ref="saml:Advice" minOccurs="0"/> 
9   <choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
10    <element ref="saml:Statement"/> 
11    <element ref="saml:AuthnStatement"/> 
12    <element ref="saml:AuthzDecisionStatement" 
13    <element ref="saml:AttributeStatement"/> 
14    <element ref="saml:PaymentStatement" 
15   </choice> 
16  </sequence> 
17  <attribute name="Version" type="string" use= "required"/> 
18  <attribute name="ID" type="ID" use="required"/> 
19  <attribute name="IssueInstant" type="dateTime" use="required"/> 
20 </complexType> 
 
The enhanced assertion type described above provides the opportunity to transmit a new kind of statement, the 
SAML Payment Statement, within the assertion. This new statement is the only protocol element that has to be 
defined new instead of enhancing existing definitions. However, the new SAML statement has to look as 
follows: 
 
1 <element name="PaymentStatement" type="saml:PaymentStatementType"/> 
2 <complexType name="PaymentStatementType"> 
3  <complexContent> 
4   <extension base="saml:StatementAbstractType"> 
5    <sequence> 
6     <element ref="saml:SubjectLocality" minOccurs="0"/> 
7     <element ref="saml:AuthnContext"/> 
8    </sequence> 
9    <attribute name="Amount" type="string" use="required"/> 
10    <attribute name="Currency" type="string" use="required"/> 
11   </extension> 
12  </complexContent> 
13 </complexType> 
 
Although the SAML specification does not mention a validation request and response, the above defined and 
enhanced protocol elements can be used together with the existing SAML definitions to request validation. The 
Service Provider has to request validation at a Payment Provider by sending an AssertionIDRequest to the Payment 
Provider that has issued the payment data. The only information needed for generating such a request is the 
assertion ID and the issuing Payment Provider. Since both pieces of information are transmitted to the Service 
Provider within the payment data, the Service Provider can easily generate a SAML request that will be 
interpreted by the Payment Provider as request for validation. If all checks at the Payment Provider are passed 
successfully, the Payment Provider will mark the payment data in the local storage as being spent and it will 
answer the validation request by sending the whole payment assertion corresponding to the assertion ID in the 
request message to the Service Provider. The transmission of the payment assertion will be recognized by the 
Service Provider as positive validation information, if the assertion received from the payer and the one received 
from the Payment Provider are exactly the same. Using this schema, the payment data validation process can be 
integrated into the protocol definitions without changing anything more. 
Whilst the above mentioned protocol changes only focus on protocol definitions, but not on processes, the next 
paragraphs describe how those changes are used to fulfil the requirements related to the payment processes, 
which are: data generation, data payment and data reimbursement. 
 
Payment data generation is initialized by the consumer or the Service Provider. The requestor sends a SAML 
Request, carrying a request for a SAML Payment Assertion to the Payment Provider. The Payment Provider 
checks the request as described above and returns either a SAML Payment Artifact, which is a pointer to the 
SAML Payment Assertion stored at the Payment Provider, or a SAML Payment Assertion to the requestor, 
depending on the specific request. 
 
Whenever payment shall be done using SAML payment data, the payee, e.g., the Service Provider, sends a 
request for payment to the payer, e.g., the consumer. The payer, in turn, requests payment data at his/her 
Payment Provider, signs the data and sends it to the payee. The payee can, if wanted, request validation at the 
Payment Provider that has issued the assertion. To do so, he/she generates an AssertionIDRequest and sends this 
request to the Payment Provider. The Payment Provider validates the assertion request as described above and 
answers, if the validation has been passed successfully, with the stored payment assertion. This assertion proves 
the payee that the received data has not been spent before 
 
The third process, in which the novel designed payment data is being used, is the reimbursement of payment data 
into real money. This process is usually initiated by thr payee of a payment process with a request for 
reimbursement at the Payment Provider. The Payment Provider, in turn, answers with a request for payment data 
and the payee sends this data for reimbursement to the Payment Provider. There, the above described 
mechanisms are used to validate the data and the result is reported to the payee. 
Security Considerations 
Whenever payment is required, there is a strong focus on security. Regarding SAML Payment, the security 
issues can be split into three different areas of interests. The first is related to the common attacks on 
communication systems. Here, attacks such as Man-in-the-Middle, DoS and eavesdropping can be mentioned 
being just a few from a large collection of different attacks. However, these attacks are not related to the 
payment processes, but to the communication systems in general. Therefore, these attacks and their related 
countermeasures are not described here, since much research in this area has already been done – and for every 
known attack the known countermeasures can be used also for the payment process without further 
consideration. The second area of attack is related to SAML. Here, also much research has been done and their 
results [9] are such that the payment security challenges are not related to the general attacks on SAML, since 
such possible attacks and their countermeasures have already been described. However, the third kind of attack 
is that related to the payment data itself. Even if the communication channel and the protocol are secure, nothing 
can prevent tampering with the payment data. Thus, each entity that owns payment data (usually the Consumer 
before and the Service Provider after payment) must not maliciously change and use the payment data. Although 
this paper does not focus on a detailed description of security issues, since they have been already described in 
[10], the two main actions of misbehaviour are highlighted, to give an idea of those attacks the payment data 
design has to prevent. The two main attacks that are to be avoided, are tampering with the payment data and 
using it more than once (overspending). Both attacks and possible solutions to avoid them are described in the 
following sections. 
Overspending 
The first major problem is overspending. Both, the Service Provider and the consumer could try to copy the 
payment data and reuse it afterwards. The consumer could, e.g., reuse the payment data for a further payment. 
The Service Provider, in turn, could request a reimbursement of the same data into real money more than once. 
In both cases, this misuse would lead to illegally doubling the amount of money contained within the payment 
data. 
Data Modification 
The other challenge that this work focuses on is preventing payment data from being modified. If the data is not 
secured in an appropriate way, the consumer or the Service Provider may try to modify it, e.g., to increase the 
amount contained within the data. After such a change, the consumer could try to pay with the tampered data or 
the Service Provider could try to reimburse the tampered data into real money. In both cases, this misuse would 
lead to an illegal payment. 
Software Security 
To avoid or at least to detect the misbehaviours described above, two possible countermeasures exist; one is a 
software based solution and the other an approach relying on hardware. Both solutions have their own 
advantages and drawbacks, therefore, both are described in detail here without considering one of them as being 
better. 
 
Whilst the secured hardware solution provides strong security with the disadvantage of hardware dependence, as 
described below, the software solution, in turn, offers security at a high level without having this drawback. The 
concept of the software solution is that the Payment Provider stores data in local storage. Whenever payment 
data is received, e.g., by a Service Provider, the receiver requests validation at the issuing Payment Provider. 
Therefore, directly after receiving payment data, the payee sends a validation request to the Payment Provider. 
The Payment Provider, in turn, checks whether the data has been modified or already spent. The result of the 
validation is then sent to the requesting entity. Obviously, this solution offers high security, but it also has some 
drawbacks: the software solution requires the Payment Provider to be online and accessible at all times. A 
further disadvantage is the network traffic overhead generated by the messages related to validation. 
When strong security is not required, the software solution can also offer a weaker security approach. Here, the 
request for validation is not carried out and the Service Provider accepts the received payment data providing the 
data’s lifetime and signatures are valid. The consumer’s account at the Payment Provider is charged at the end of 
the process when the Service Provider requests reimbursement at the issuing Payment Provider. When using this 
approach, no network traffic overhead is generated, but a high level of trust inside the federation is required, 
since the consumer could double-spend the data and leave the federation before his/her account could be 
charged. In turn, a Service Provider could copy a received token and may request the reimbursement twice. 
If the software solution is chosen, the payment data has to be a combination of the following elements, whether 
or not a strong or weak security approach is favoured: 
• Amount: Payment Provider, Service Provider and Consumer must know the amount conveyed by the 
payment data. 
• Currency: Payment Provider, Service Provider and Consumer must know the currency conveyed by the 
payment data. 
• Payment Provider ID: Service Provider must know where to reimburse the payment data it has received 
into real money. 
• Payment Provider Signature: Non-repudiation about the issuing Payment Provider is needed during 
reimbursement. 
• Sender ID: Consumer must be identified for account charging or when he/she acts maliciously. 
• Sender’s Signature: Non-repudiation when the paying Consumer’s account is debited or when he/she 
acts maliciously. 
• Payment Data ID: Needed by the Payment Provider to detect misuse. 
• Payment Data Lifetime: Needed to control the data’s validity. 
The validation of this approach has proven that only if all those parts of the data are combined into one payment 
dataset, can it be used within the software security approach. None of the data can be left out without losing the 
security required. For sure, more data could be added, e.g., a transaction identifier, but since such data could lead 
to a loss of privacy, within this work using the least amount of data as possible has been selected. This set of 
information is mentioned again in the scenario section below to prove that all required data are conveyed within 
the example assertion. 
Hardware Security 
Whilst the software security approach focuses on flexibility of the federation, but requires validation at the 
issuing Payment Provider during each payment process, the hardware security solution provides independency 
from the Payment Provider when executing the payment process. This approach allows the type of hardware to 
be chosen freely, as long as it fulfils the following requirements: 
• Non-modifiable private key: The secured hardware contains a private key that cannot be modified 
without it being destroyed. 
• Signing the data: As long as the payment process was done correctly, the secured hardware signs the 
data with its private key. 
• Secured application: The application that is used for payment is secured by the hardware; the 
application could not be modified without being detected (e.g., by validating the application’s 
signature). 
• Controlling data: All data regarding payment, such as lifetime and ID of the payment data generated by 
a Payment Provider are controlled by the secured hardware, e.g., by storing the data in hardware 
secured local storage. 
Thus, it does not matter whether a trusted hardware module, a Smartcard, a secure USB stick, etc. is used. When 
the secured hardware is able to cover the requirements mentioned above, neither tampering nor overspending is 
possible. Overspending can be easily avoided if the payment application stores the payment data ID and lifetime. 
Whenever a federation participant wants to send payment data, the payment application checks if the ID has 
already been stored in a table containing data about past payments. If so, the payment data can no longer be used. 
If the federation participant tries to send the payment data without using the payment application, the secured 
hardware will not sign the data and the receiver of the data being aware of the public keys of all secured 
hardware elements in the federation, will easily detect such misuse and reject the payment data. Therefore, 
signing the data with a private key belonging to the secured hardware prevents any successful tampering of data. 
Since the data is signed by the sender with its secured hardware private key, the federation participant cannot 
modify any part of the data without losing the signature’s validity. Thus, providing the payment application does 
not accept payment data with an invalid signature and if trying to transmit payment data without using the 
payment application leads to a loss of the secured hardware signature, a tampering of the payment data cannot be 
done without losing its validity. 
Obviously, using secured hardware leads to a very high level of payment security within the federation. The 
current available hardware could be used to secure the federation payment in such a way that a misuse is almost 
impossible. However, this high security comes with some disadvantages: firstly is the dependence on hardware. 
Every federation member, from the providers to the consumers, has to have such secured hardware. Thus, 
joining a federation dynamically is not possible. Upgrading to improved versions could require exchanging all 
the secured hardware. Finally, the cost of the secured hardware should not be forgotten. 
When using hardware-based security, the payment data has to contain some specific elements to support all 
payment related processes within the federation, which results in the following information requirements: 
• Amount: Payment Provider, Service Provider and Consumer must know the amount conveyed by the 
payment data. 
• Currency: Payment Provider, Service Provider and Consumer must know the currency conveyed by the 
payment data. 
• Payment Provider ID: Service Provider must know where to reimburse the payment data it has received 
into real money. 
• Secured Hardware Signature: Hardware signature provides assuredness that the payment data was never 
modified or maliciously misused. 
• Payment Data ID: Needed by the secured hardware to detect misuse. 
• Payment Data Lifetime: Needed to control the data’s validity. 
The validation of the hardware security solution has proven that, if all these parts of the data are combined into 
one payment dataset, this payment dataset can be used for all payment processes within the federation, providing 
the secured hardware solution has been implemented. Within the scenario section, this set of information is 
mentioned again to show that the data, conveyed within the example assertion, fulfill the requirements of this 
hardware security solution. 
Implementation and Validation 
The payment solution described within this paper has been validated and implemented after being designed. The 
formal validation was carried out to prove that the approach designed is able to handle the requirements for 
federation based payments. However, this validation was done using the model validation tool Telelogic Tau 
[11]. All elements of the payment enabled federation have been designed as state machines being able to 
understand those signals, which are exchanged during the payment related processes. The result of this validation 
was that the model, if designed following the requirements above, is able to support all payment related 
processes. Thus, the designed solution could be used for federation based payments in theory. 
 
For measurements and real-life proof, a prototype has been designed. This prototype is able to support the 
payment solutions described within this paper. For demonstration purposes, an Identity Provider, a Service 
Provider, and a Payment Provider have been established. All three providers have been implemented as Web-
Services using Axis and running on a Tomcat Webserver. Within the prototypical federation, OpenSAML has 
been used to handle the SAML protocol and a small add-on to OpenSAML was implemented to deal with the 
specific and new elements rising from the SAML payment issue.  On consumer’s side, a JAVA client was 
deployed, but, depending on the chosen SAML profile [12], a browser could also act as consumer client. Whilst 
the validation has proven the formal correctness of the payment approach, the implementation has shown that a 
real-life usage of the proposed payment solution is possible. 
Scenario 
The scenario already mentioned in the Introduction is now described more in detail. The actions carried out by 
the federation’s participants are explained as well as the protocol elements they use for their actions.  
 
The Student S has in addition to his/her identity account at his/her Home University (HU) another account at HU 
to control payments within the academic federation. Therefore, HU acts as Payment Provider, too. S has used the 
payment function offered by HU sometimes when he/she had to print out some papers. When he/she moves to 
the Foreign University (FU), he/she does not have the need to create new accounts at FU, since both, HU and 
FU, are participants in the same academic SAML federation, in which payment is supported. However, after a 
while studying at FU, S needs again some printed papers. Therefore, he/she uses again the federation technology 
to log in at HU, but, in contrast to the current deployed federations, S requests a payment assertion in addition to 
the authentication information. The Payment Provider at HU inspects the authentication information and checks, 
whether S has enough money at his/her account at HU. He/she has, and the Payment Provider at HU generates 
the requested Payment Assertion, stores locally the assertion and the student’s username in a database and sends 
the generated assertion to S. This assertion could look as follows: 
 
1 <samlp:Response 
2  xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" 
3  xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" 
4  xmlns:saml=SAML Payment Respnse Namespace 
5  ID="s2a0da3504aff978b0f8c80f6a62c713c4a2f64c5b" 
6  InResponseTo="_bec424fa5103428909a30ff1e31168327f79474984" 
7  Version="2.0" 
8  IssueInstant="2008-09-15T20:03:25.32Z" 
9  Destination="student_S@home-university.edu"> 
10  <saml:Issuer> https://payment-provider.home-university.edu/assertions </saml:Issuer> 
11  <!-- Signature of Response --> 
12  <ds:Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> Payment Provider Signature 
13  </ds:Signature> 
14  <Status> 
15   <StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/> 
16  </Status> 
17  <!-- SAML PAYMENT ASSERTION --> 
18  <saml:Assertion 
19   Version="2.0" 
20   ID="_a75adf55-01d7-40cc-929f-dbd8372ebdfc" 
21   IssueInstant="2008-09-15T20:03:25.32Z"> 
22   <saml:Issuer> https:// payment-provider.home-university.edu/assertions/ </saml:Issuer> 
23   <!-- Signature of Assertion --> 
24   <ds:Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> Payment Provider Signature 
25   </ds:Signature> 
26   <saml:Conditions> 
27    NotBefore="2009-05-15T20:03:25.32Z" 
28    NotOnOrAfter="2010-05-15T20:03:25.33Z" 
29   /> 
30   <saml:PaymentStatement> 
31    <saml:PaymentAttribute Name="amount"> 
32     <saml:PaymentAttributeValue xsi:type= "xsd:string">0.50 
33    </saml:PaymentAttributeValue> 
34    </saml:PaymentAttribute> 
35    <saml:PaymentAttribute Name="currency"> 
36     <saml:PaymentAttributeValue xsi:type= "xsd:string">EUR 
37     </saml:PaymentAttributeValue> 
38    </saml:PaymentAttribute> 
39   </saml:PaymentStatement> 
40  </saml:Assertion> 
41 </samlp:Response> 
 
However, when S receives the assertion from his/her Payment Provider at HU, he/she contacts the printer 
application and requests the print job. The printer application answers with a request for a payment assertion. 
After having received this request, S sends his/her payment assertion to the printer application as payment. The 
printer application, in turn, requests validation of the received payment assertion at the Payment Provider at HU. 
The information needed for that request is - as described above - assertion ID and issuing Payment Provider. 
However, both pieces of information can be easily extracted from the received assertion (line 20 and line 22 of 
the listing above). The Payment Provider at HU receives the request for validation from the printer application 
and looks up in the local storage for an assertion with the received assertion’s ID and checks, whether the found 
assertion has been marked as already spent. Since this is not the case, the Payment Provider sends the found 
assertion to the printer application. The printer application checks, whether the assertion received from the 
Payment Provider is the same as the one received from S, and allows, after finishing the check with a positive 
result, S to print the pages requested.  
 
 
This scenario provides information about two different issues regarding the SAML Payment approach: Firstly, it 
clearly states how the approach can be used in real-life. It describes, how the federation participants have to 
interact to offer a federation based payment. Secondly, the example assertion, mentioned within the scenario, can 
be used as proof that all requirements given by the security analysis of the hardware and the software security 
solution are fulfilled when the defined SAML Payment Assertion is being used. The following table provides an 
overview on (a) the requirements derived from the security analysis and (b) the line numbers where the needed 
information is found in the example assertion. 
 
 
Software Security Hardware Security Example Assertion 
Amount Amount Lines 31 to 34 
Currency Currency Lines 35 to 38 
Payment Provider ID Payment Provider ID Line 22 
Payment Provider Signature --- Line 24 and 25 
Sender ID --- Line 10 
Sender’s Signature --- Line 12 and 13 
Payment Data ID Payment Data ID Line 20 
Payment Data Lifetime Payment Data Lifetime Line 26 to 29 
--- Secured Hardware Signature Lines 12/13 and 24/25 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has introduced a SAML federation based payment solution to support the charging of roaming 
students. The academic federations already deployed have been analysed and a solution for the missing payment 
has been found. The establishment of this payment solution followed the concept to change as less as possible; 
therefore, the federation’s architecture and its protocol have been taken as foundation for the new payment 
concept. However, depending on the kind of required security, this paper provided three different solutions, from 
a weak and independent software to an inflexible high-security hardware approach.  
To enable such payments, the federation has to be enhanced with a Payment Provider and a small add-on for the 
used protocol must be deployed. Furthermore, the applications on Service Providers’ side should be able to 
handle the SAML payment protocol elements. However, these additional costs are marginal compared with the 
benefits, the federation participants could gain from the SAML payment: Participants of such a payment enabled 
federation are able to offer charging requiring services to the consumers without having the need to establish 
anything more than the enhanced federation software. Within an academic federation, e.g., universities do not 
longer have to build a payment solution for roaming students – implementing the enhanced federation software 
will be enough. 
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